ABSTRACT As a kind of machine readable symbol, the Quick Response (QR) code is widely used in all walks of life due to its large information capacity, strong error correction ability and fast read speed. However, the public encoding of the QR code makes its contents unsafe. In this paper, we introduce a novel rich QR code with three-layer information that utilizes the characteristics of the Hamming code and the error correction mechanism of the QR code to protect the secret information. The first layer information, that is, the public information, can be decoded by any standard QR reader. The XOR operation is performed on all shares to obtain the second layer information. Finally, the pixels of the same position in all shares are taken as a set of Hamming codes, respectively, and the third layer information is extracted by a matrix multiplication operation. Compared to other related schemes, the proposed scheme has the advantage of high information embedding efficiency and strong robustness against common image post-processing attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the mobile internet era, the development of the information industry driven by ''Internet +'' has made a major breakthrough. As a product of continuous efforts and exploration in the field of machine vision, QR codes [1] break the constraints of the original industrial marketing model and promote the traditional industrial structure to the ''Internet +'' industry with its online-to-offline information docking method. Nowadays, QR codes are widely used in the fields of logistics and transportation, product sales, and many other areas that require automated information management. However, as QR code is a machine readable symbol, its public coding method makes its stored information lack security protection. In order to improve the security of QR code applications, domestic and foreign scholars have proposed a series of security solutions.
Based on the traditional cryptography scheme, Wang et al. [2] proposed a nonlinear optical encryption scheme based on the phase truncated Fresnel transform. The secret QR code was encrypted into a pseudo-random noise image under the control of two private keys, which
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led to a high security. However, the scheme needs special optical instruments when decrypting, which greatly reduces the application value. Chuang et al. [3] used the Lagrange interpolation algorithm to share the secret information into several parts, and then encoded it into the two-level QR code. Huang et al. [4] proposed a two-way authentication scheme based on the Needham-Schroeder protocol and also used Gong-Needham-Yahalom logic to analyze the anti-attack capability of the authentication protocol. Krishna et al. [5] proposed a product anti-counterfeiting scheme using the DES (Data Encryption Standard) algorithm, which encoded the encrypted ciphertext together with the plaintext information into two levels of QR code. Since Ref [3] - [5] stored the plaintext and ciphertext in a given carrier QR code simultaneously, the secret payload capacity was limited. Combined with the characteristics of QR code and image secret sharing, Cheng et al. [10] proposed a Two-Level QR code scheme based on visual cryptography and the pattern recognition technique, which replaced a module of the QR code with a 3×3 submodule, stored public information in the central submodule, and carried secret information in 8 locations around. In the process of secret recovery, all transparencies were directly XOR-ed to obtain the secret information. However, the scheme had a weak anti-noise ability.
Based on the information hiding scheme, Tkachenko et al. [6] designed several pattern recognition units and selected the black module of the QR code from the unit according to the secret scrambling sequence to realize two-level storage of information. However, the two-level QR code generated by the scheme had a large pixel expansion, and the secret extraction algorithm had higher requirements on the resolution of the machine. Chiang et al. [7] used wet paper to embed secret information into the carrier image to achieve blind extraction. In order to increase the secret load capacity, Lin et al. [8] improved the algorithm so that the upper limit of the number of embedded bits can reach the maximum data capacity of the QR code. Afterward, Lin [9] proposed an (n, n) threshold secret sharing scheme. The scheme obtained n bit streams by a random number generation algorithm and a hash algorithm and then concealed it into the carrier image using wet paper to produce n two-level QR codes, which can resist the noise interference caused by the printing process. However, the embedding rate of the secret information is not fully considered, and the secret capacity is still low. Liu et al. [11] proposed an extended image sharing algorithm based on QR code, but the shares are distorted and may attract the attention of the potential attackers.
To overcome the shortcomings of the above scheme, in this paper, we propose a novel and high-embedding efficiency sharing scheme based on QR code and Hamming code, which realize the aim of three-layer embedding of information with high robustness. The first layer information is encoded as the public information QR code, and the XOR result of all the shares are used as the second layer information; then, the modification rule in the second layer information is used as the index of the third layer information, and the Hamming code is utilized to embed the third layer of information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some preliminaries concerning our study. The proposed scheme is described in Section III. The security of the proposed scheme is discussed in Section IV. Section V provides the experiments and analysis to illustrate the feasibility of this work and how this study improves on previous work. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. HAMMING CODE [12] Hamming code is a linear error correction code, which was invented by Richard Wesley Hamming in 1950. Hamming code is a typical complete code and is a high-efficiency code that corrects a single error.
Definition 1: Hamming code is a kind of (n, k) linear block code with the check matrix H , whose column is composed of all m-rearranged vectors that are not all 0s and are different from each other, where n, k, m indicates the length of the hamming code, parity bits and information bits.
The (2 k -1, 2 k -k-1) Hamming codes can be used to construct a stego-code and embed kbits of messages into 2 k -1 pixels by changing, at most, one of them. Taking (7, 4) Hamming code for example, we explain how to embed and extract 3 bits of messages into 7 pixels. Let H be the parity check matrix of the (7, 4) Hamming code whose columns are in the natural order of increasing binary numbers. 
The result obtained according to formula (2) where ⊕ represents XOR operation is a binary representation of three, that is, the third column of the check matrix H . The information is embedded by changing the third bit of x. Finally, the changed message bit stream is x . When the secret information is extracted, only calculate
B. QR CODES
The international standard for QR codes [8] defines a total of 40 symbol versions and 4 error correction levels, which presented by V-E. V (1 to 40) is the version number, which determines the size of a QR code. E (L, M, Q, H) denotes four error correction levels, corresponding to four error correction capacities (7%, 15%, 25%, 30%), respectively. Fig.1 is the structure of version 7. As shown, the QR code consists of two parts: an encoding region and functional patterns. Functional patterns include position detection graphics, delimiters, positioning graphics, and correction graphics. The coding region contains format information, version information, and data and error correction codewords. The QR code employs Reed-Solomon error control coding to detect and correct errors. A series of error correction codewords is generated, and the code words are added to the data codeword sequence to enable the symbol to withstand damage without loss of data. Table 1 lists, for some specific version and Error Correction Level, the total number of codewords, the total number of error correction codewords, and the structure. It can be seen from the Table 1 that the larger the version and the error correction level are, the larger the secret payload of the QR code and the stronger the error correction capability. The proposed scheme mainly utilizes the error correction characteristics of the QR code to design a secret sharing scheme.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This paper designs an (n, n) secret sharing scheme where n = 2 p . In the proposed scenario, there is a secret distributor, a secret compositor, and n participants. The secret distributor embeds the second layer information and the third layer information into the carrier QR code to generate a number of QR code shares, and each QR code share can be accurately read by the standard QR code decoder. When the secret recovery is performed, it is necessary to obtain the second layer information by the XOR operation. Then, the third layer information is extracted. An overview of the proposed scheme is shown in Fig.2 .
A. SECRET SHARING PROCEDURE
It is assumed that the carrier QR code C i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 2 p ) is different and can be decoded and read by a standard QR code decoder. The second layer information stream is v, and the third layer information is s. 
1) PRELIMINARY PHASE
The proposed scheme utilizes the error correction mechanism of the QR code to embed information. Let E denote the number of error correction codewords of the QR code. According to the QR code generation algorithm, it can be known that the error correction capability is less than half of the number of error correction codewords. Therefore, the number of reverse pixels in each carrier QR code caused by the second layer information embedding cannot exceed half of the number of error correction code words, which means C = E/2 × 8.
The proposed scheme utilizes the error correction principle of Hamming code to realize the embedding of third layer information. Therefore, the Hamming code check matrix must be shared between the secret distributor and the secret compositor. Moreover, since the Hamming code composed of the corresponding position pixels in the first 2 p -1 shares is used as the carrier of the third layer information, it is necessary to agree on the parity check matrix
Hamming code in advance.
2) CONCEALMENT PHASE
The processing of our scheme for a single pixel C k (i, j) in the carrier image is shown in Fig.3 .
The detailed algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. Finally, the secret distributor distributes the generated shares to the participants. It is worth noting that the algorithm constrains the embedded position of the third layer information to ensure the readability of the shares, which is fully demonstrated in the algorithm Steps 6 and 7. Individual participants can decode the public information of the shares through the standard QR code reader but cannot obtain the second layer information and third layer information.
B. SECRET REVEALING PROCEDURE
In the proposed scheme, all shares are required to perform a simple superimposed XOR operation to obtain the second layer information. Finally, the matrix is multiplied to extract the third layer information. Specific steps are as follows:
1) THE RECOVERY OF THE SECOND LAYER INFORMATION
See Algorithm 2.
2) THE EXTRACTION OF THIRD LAYER INFORMATION
See Algorithm 3.
IV. SECURITY PROOF
Since the first layer information of the shares is as same as the information stored by the carrier QR codes, and both the 
, where i and j respectively represents the row and column of the carrier QR code. x and y respectively marks the pixel locations of the second layer information stream and the third layer information stream, and count k (k = 1, 2, . . . , 2 p ) represents the number of pixels changed in the k-th carrier QR code.
Step 2:
. . , 2 p ) belongs to the functional patterns of QR code, j = j + 1 and go to Step 10. Otherwise, calculate the result of XOR-ing each column element of the pixel block
Step 3:
and go to
Step 10. Otherwise, go to Step 4.
Step 4: Calculate the companion matrix
Step 5: Using the error correction principle of Hamming code, calculate
Step 6. Otherwise, go to
Step 7.
Step 6: If count
Step 9.
Step 7: Find the same column in H p×(2 p −1) as I and let p denote the corresponding column number. If
Step 8: If y > length(s ), then index(i, j) = null, the embedding of the third layer information is completed; go to Step 12. Otherwise, go to Step 9.
Step 9: If x >length(v), the embedding of the second layer information is completed; go to Step 12. Otherwise, go to
Step 10.
Step 10: If j < n, then go to Step 2. Otherwise, go to Step 11.
Step 11: If i < m, then go to Step 2. Otherwise, go to Step 12.
Step 12: The algorithm ends. Output: The second layer information v.
Step 1:
Step 2: Let i = 1, j = 1, v ={}, count = 0, where i and j represent the row and column of the carrier QR code, respectively. v is used to store the extracted the second layer information, and count is used to count the number of bits in the second layer information.
Step 3: If QR k (i, j) (k = 1, 2, . . . , 2 p ) belongs to the functional patterns of QR code, go to Step 6. Otherwise, go to Step 4.
Step 4: If count ≤ length(v), go to
Step 5. Otherwise, the extraction of the second layer information is completed, and go to Step 8.
Step 5: Let count = count+1, and calculate
, where ''∪'' presents the consolidation of sets.
Step 6: j = j + 1. If j < n, then go to Step 3. Otherwise, go to Step 7.
Step 7:
Step 3. Otherwise, go to Step 8.
Step 8: The algorithm ends.
version and error correction level can be obtained, an adversary can produce the original carrier QR codes correctly. As such, it is easy to calculate the difference by comparing the original carrier QR codes with the shares. Despite this, it cannot reconstruct the secret from the information alone. Theorem 1: The probability of success to infer the second layer and the third layer information based on an individual share will be bounded by 1/2 l 1 and
l 2 , respectively.
Proof:
When the adversary has and only has an individual share S t , it is possible to adopt the opponent a brute force strategy akin to a dictionary attack. Let
. .⊕S n = S; thus, for each pixel in S t , the S t (i, j) = S(i, j) ⊕ A(i, j) exists, which means one secret pixel can be decoded correctly with a probability of 0.5 based on a corresponding pixel in the available share. This assumes that the length of the second layer information l 1 =length(v) is available for the adversary. Therefore, the probability of success to infer the second layer information will be bounded by 1/2 l 1 .
In light of the fact that it is possible for the adversary to obtain the length of the third layer information l 2 = length(s) and the length of the Hamming code, which is 2 p -1, the −1 (1, 1) QR 2 p −1 (1, 2) . . .
Step 2: Let i = 1, j = 1, s ={}, where i and j, respectively, represent the row and column of the carrier QR code. s is used to store the extracted the third layer information.
Step 3 Step
where ''∪'' presents the consolidation of sets.
Step 5: j = j + 1. If j < n, then go to Step 3. Otherwise, go to Step 7.
Step 6: i = i + 1. If i < m, then go to Step 3. Otherwise, go to Step 7.
Step 7: The algorithm ends.
adversary can infer the companion matrix and one corresponding Hamming code by 1/ (2 p − 1)! and 1/2 n−2 , respectively. Meanwhile, it is difficult to obtain the embedding position, which leads to a 1/C l 2 m×n probability to accurately guess the positions. Thus, the probability of success for this attack of the third layer information will be bounded by
End Theorem 2: The probability of success to infer the second layer and the third layer information based on n − 1 shares will be bounded by 1/2 l 1 and
It is conceivable that n-1 participants may collude and combine the information from their shares together in an attempt to find S, which is called collusion attack. Let
which is similar to the analysis in the Theorem 1. As above, the probability to infer the second layer information will be bounded by 1/2 l 1 .
Because the adversary has n−1 shares, there is at most one share that cannot participate in reconstructing the Hamming code. The probability that n − 1 shares can construct the Hamming code accurately is 1/n. In this case, the adversary can reconstruct the Hamming code with a probability of 1, so the third layer information can be obtained by 1/[n × C l 2 m×n × (2 p − 1)!]. The probability that only a share does not participate in reconstructing the Hamming codes is 1-1/n. In this case, the adversary can reconstruct the Hamming code with a probability of 0.5, so the third layer information can be obtained by
. Therefore, the total probability of decoding the third layer information
End
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
Further verification of the feasibility of the scheme, including its robustness and secret payload, is illustrated in this section. In addition, some comparisons and analysis on related work are provided.
A. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section, we use the (8, 8) scheme as an example; we choose the QR code of version 1 with error correction level L as the carrier image, and the 24-bit and 32-bit streams are included as the second layer information and the third layer information, respectively. Table 2 shows the dataset for the experiment, and the corresponding images of the experiment are given in Fig.4 , where (a)-(h) are the carrier QR codes with sizes of 250 × 250, and (a)-(h) in Fig.5 are the shares with sizes of 250 × 250. The carrier QR codes are generated by the standard QR code generator ''PsQREdit 2.4.3-Chinese'', and the shares in Fig.5 can be recognized by a standard QR code decoder or device with a decoding function; the recognized results remain consistent with the test case, which proves the effectiveness of the scheme. The proposed scheme is realized by MATLAB, through which the second layer information and the third layer information are completely extracted, proving the correctness of the scheme.
B. PERFORMANCE TESTING AND ANALYSIS

1) ROBUSTNESS
The print and scan operation for the share is practiced extensively in commercial magazines, posters, and publication fields. In order to illustrate that the proposed scheme supports cross-carrier applications, we use the HP LaserJet 500 color M551 printer to print at 600 × 600 dpi, and scan with the HP LaserJet M2727nf scanner at 200 × 200 dpi. The results are shown in Table 3 .
In real-world applications, suffering from external interference is unavoidable. To test the robustness of shares, we analyze the performance of the generated shares when they are distorted by various types of interference. Considering the case that when the mobile device scans the shares, the scanning angle is not fixed, the share is rotated at different angles. In addition, the compression technique usually is used to compress the share for reducing the storage space. To evaluate the feasibility of the proposed scheme, we compress the share with jpg compression values of 0, 3, 5 and 12, respectively. Moreover, noise always occurs when the share is transmitted via open channels or captured in the real word. Here, MATLAB is used to add Gaussian noise with a mean µ = 0 and variances δ 2 = 0.1, δ 2 = 0.2, δ 2 = 0.3 and δ 2 = 0.5. Gaussian blurring is added with radius of 1 pixel, 1.5 pixels, 2 pixels and 2.5 pixels. Additionally, the information of the share is also concerned in the acquisition process. The results after the above interference are analyzed, and the specific tests are shown in Table 3 , where ''Readable'' indicates that the processed share can be read by a standard QR code reader or devices with a decoding function, and ''Decodable'' indicates that the processed share can be used as an input to the scheme to extract the second layer and the third layer information.
Since the number of flipped pixels of each carrier QR code is less than C/2, the generated shares maintain the readability of the QR code. To verify the readability of the distorted share Table 4 , we use three mobile phones, the Apple iPhone7, HUAWEI Mate20 Pro and 360vizza, to decode the above two types of typical distorted shares in Table 4 ; results are shown in Table 5 .
2) SECRET PAYLOAD
There are 2 p carrier QR codes with sizes of m × n; the length of the second layer information is x bits, the length of the third layer information stream is y bits, the number of error correction code words is E, and the total secret amount is amount. The module of the QR code satisfies the following formula (4) .
Based on the proposed scheme, some pixels may be changed, which is caused by the embedding of the second layer information stream. The positions of these flipped pixels are used as position indexes to embed the third layer information stream, and the 1-bit flipping pixels may transmit p-bit information. However, the error correction mechanism of the QR code and the content of the third layer information itself restrict the embedding position. Therefore, the third layer information must satisfy formula (6) .
If, and only if, the XOR-ed results of each column of the carrier pixel block are equal to the second layer information stream, then y = 0 exists. In addition, when all the positions of flipped pixels satisfy the embedding condition of the third layer information stream, y =px exists. Formula (7) and formula (8) exist when l bits of the XOR-ed results of each column of the carrier pixel block are equal to the second layer information stream and if there are q carrier QR codes that are changed after embedding the third layer information. When l = 0, formula (8) turns into formula (9)
Based on the above analysis, the upper limit of the total secret payload of the scheme is
The maximum secret payload carried by a single carrier QR code is payload = amount/2 p ,which can described in detail as formula (11) .
Given a case where p = 3 and q = 8, formula (11) can be written as formula (12) .
From formula (12) , it can be concluded that both the size of the carrier QR code and error correction level determine the upper limit of the information payload in the proposed scheme. Since the size of the QR code is decided by the QR code version and the size of the QR code module, the control variates method should be utilized to analyze the relationship between the influencing factors and upper limit of the information payload in detail.
For when the size of the module is fixed, this section takes the QR code of module= 1 as an example and analyzes the relationship between the upper limit of the information payload and the version of the QR code. The relation graph is shown in Fig.6 , where it is clear that when module= 1, the upper limit of the payload increases as the version and the error correction capability of the QR code increases, with a minimum 96 bits. When the version is fixed, this section uses the QR code with version number 1 as an example and analyzes the relationship among the upper limit of the information payload, the size of the QR code module and the error correction level. The relationship graph is shown in Fig.7 . It can be concluded that by adjusting the module, the upper limit of the information payload can be greatly improved under the certain version and error correction level. When the module is fixed, the payload is proportional to the error correction level.
3) COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
Comparisons and discussions of this paper and other related schemes are provided in this section. Table 6 lists the overall comparisons of this paper and other related schemes. Table 6 provides an overall comparison of the QR-related data hiding schemes, watermarking schemes, visual cryptography scheme, and general secret sharing schemes, in addition to the proposed approach.
a: METHOD & COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF EXTRACTION
Based on the secret sharing and hiding technology, Ref [9] , [13] design the two-level QR code of which the public information can be read by any device with decoding function, and the secret information only can be extracted by the legal authorized personnel. The main operation of [9] is based on hash function, whose computational complexity is O(N 2 ). While [13] mainly includes addition and modulo operations, which results in a low computational complexity as O(N ). Based on visual cryptography, Ref [10] , [14] , [15] realize the embedding of information in the QR code with the low computational complexity of decryption as O(N ). Ref [16] is a secret hiding scheme by improving exploiting modification direction to protect the private message in QR code with the computational complexity as O(N ). The time complexity of [2] where an optical encryption is used decided by parameter λ. Ref [17] , [18] both use digital watermarking technology to realize the embedding of secret information. Because the schemes employ discrete cosine transform to perform operations in the frequency domain, its computational complexity is relatively high. In the proposed scheme, the second layer of information decryption is completed by a simple XOR operation, and the third layer of information is extracted by matrix multiplication. Apparently, our paper has low time complexity when compared with some other works.
b: UTILIZING THE ERROR CORRECTION CAPABILITY
Based on the error correction mechanism of QR code, this paper and Ref [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] realize the embedding of secret information by changing the partial codewords of QR code with the condition of ensuring the readability of QR code. Ref [10] , [14] replace the module of the QR code with different forms of pixel blocks to embed the secret information based on the decoding characteristics of the QR code.
c: SECRET CAPACITY
Let p = 3, and compare the secret payload of the proposed scheme with Ref [9] , [10] , [13] - [16] .
Ref [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] utilize the error correction capability of the QR code to implement the embedding of secret information by modifying a part of the pixels of the QR code, which limits the maximum payload of the secret information to the error correction capability of the QR code. while this paper uses the XOR operation and Hamming code error correction principle to realize the reuse of carrier pixels. Therefore, the secret payload of the proposed scheme is higher than Ref [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] . Based on the decoding characteristic of the QR code, Ref [10] , [14] replace all non-functional modules of the QR code with the submodules of 3 × 3 and 2 × 2 to store the secret information, respectively. So the total embedded amount is higher than our scheme. However, the generated shares are 9 times larger than the carrier QR code in [10] and 4 times larger than the carrier QR code in [14] . Therefore, the amount of secret information carried by a unit pixel in Ref [10] , [14] are lower than ours. The specific comparison results are shown in Table 7 .
In order to represent the performance more intuitively, we define the information payload rate of the carrier image (ie, the number of secret information bits carried by a unit pixel) to describe the performance, and give a graph as shown in Fig. 8 , where shows the proof that the secret payload rate of our work is higher than other works.
d: ROBUSTNESS
This section will compare and analyze the performance against cropping attack, Gaussian noise attack and fuzzy noise attack of the proposed scheme with other works.
The proposed scheme and Ref [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] operate on the module of the QR code directly, and occupy the error correction capability of the QR code itself to embed the secret information. The difference is that Ref [9] , [16] utilize all of the error correction capability of a single carrier QR code to achieve maximum embedding capacity of secret information. But in our work and Ref [13] , [15] , when the secret information is embedded, it takes up part of the error correction capability of a set of carrier QR codes. Therefore, this paper and [13] , [15] have stronger robustness than Ref [9] , [16] against cropping attack.
Ref [10] , [14] embed the secret by designing different identification units of QR code without occupying the error correction capability of the QR code, which leads to a stronger robustness against cropping attack than Ref [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] and the proposed scheme. However, in the case of the same size, the identification units with the size of 3 × 3 in [10] , and the identification units with the size of 2 × 2 in [14] make the shares have a higher pixel density than this paper and Ref [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] , which leads to a weaker robustness against Gaussian noise and fuzzy noise attacks than this paper and Ref [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] .
In order to test the robustness against cropping attack, we compare the proposed scheme with Ref [9] , [16] and Ref [10] , [14] , respectively. Both experiments choose the share of version 1 and of size 250 × 250 with error correction level L as the experimental object.
For the share generated by this paper and Ref [9] , [16] , crop pixel block with size of 50 × 50 at the same position. And crop pixel block in this paper and Ref [10] , [14] with size of 70 × 40 at the same position. What worth mention is that the size of the share in this paper and Ref [9] , [16] is 250 × 250, and 750 × 750 in [10] , 500 × 500 in [14] . The experiment results are provided in Table 8 .
Experimental results show that the robustness against cropping attack of the proposed scheme is weaker than Ref [10] , [14] , and stronger than Ref [9] , [16] .
When the secret image is restored, part of the secret information of Ref [9] , [10] , [14] , [16] and part of the second layer information of the proposed scheme cannot be correctly decoded. While when the damaged share does not participate in the third layer information embedding process, the extraction of the third layer information of the scheme is not affected. In order to test the robustness against noise attack of the proposed scheme, this section adds the Gaussian white noise with the mean µ = 0 and the variance of δ 2 = 0.5 to the share generated by Ref [10] , [14] , and blurs the share by Gaussian blurring with a radius of 1.5. The experimental results are shown in Table 9 .
The experimental results show that the robustness against Gaussian noise attack and fuzzy noise attack of the share generated by the proposed scheme is stronger than that of Ref [10] , [14] .
Based on experimental results and comparisons with related works, the major advantages of the proposed scheme are summarized as follows:
• Three-layer information storage: The proposed scheme can achieve the goal of embedding three-layer information by a sharing algorithm and a Hamming code decoding algorithm.
• Large secret payload: The scheme realizes the reuse of the carrier pixels by using the error correction mechanism of the Hamming code, so that the 1-bit modification can additionally transmit additional p-bit information, and the secret payload is improved by improving the embedding efficiency. Through experimental comparison and analysis, the maximum secret information payload rate of the proposed scheme is higher than [10] , [13] - [16] .
• Low computational complexity: The scheme is mainly based on ''XOR'' operation and matrix multiplication operation to realize the extraction of secret information. Compared with the traditional information hiding scheme and watermarking scheme, this scheme has the advantage of low complexity of decryption calculation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel, rich, three-layer QR code with low computational complexity. This scheme reduces the likelihood of being suspected by potential attackers when the shares are distributed via public channels. Different from other schemes, the proposed approach embeds the secret based on the module of the QR code. Experimental results show that the scheme is more robust against common image post-processing attacks, and it can specifically resist the printand-scan operation. Considering practical applications, our scheme can be used to achieve the grading management of information. For example, in order to protect a patient's medical records, the hospital can distinguish the doctor and other personnel with different limits of authority so that the patient's information cannot be maliciously disclosed. This approach can also be used to protect privacy information in express logistics. In addition, according to the characteristics of the three-layer storage of information in our scheme, the second layer information can be used to authenticate identity, and the third layer information is utilized to transmit sensitive information to improve the performance of the scheme. However, the access structure is limited. How to use wet paper technology to achieve blind extraction of third layer of information and optimize the access structure to the general access structure remain problems to be solved. 
